The Laws of Nature or Nature's God?: Penal Authority in Charles Kingsley's *The Water-Babies*

Erin Sheley

"What next will be demanded of us by physical science?" asked Charles Kingsley, in an 1871 lecture at Sion College. "Belief, certainly . . . in the permanence of natural laws" ("Natural Theology" 320). He went on to observe: "I cannot see how our Lord's parables, drawn from the birds and the flowers, the seasons and the weather, have any logical weight . . . unless we look at them as instances of laws of the natural world, which find their analogues in the laws of the spiritual world, the kingdom of God" (320). Kingsley's answer to his own question neatly summarizes a worldview in which his theological position as a clergyman of the Church of England can be reconciled with his belief in the theory of natural selection, in which his university audience would have been interested. Indeed, his adherence to natural selection had led Darwin to include a version of Kingsley's remarks upon *On the Origin of Species* in the second edition of the book, and he was an important defender of the work.[1] Most famously, Kingsley dramatized the processes of natural change in his children's novel *The Water-Babies* (1863), in which Tom, a degraded chimney-sweep, "evolves" into a morally educated Christian man by first transforming into a magical "water-baby." Contemporary critics such as Gillian Beer and John Hawley have explored Kingsley's efforts to use the developing scientific discourses of the nineteenth century—particularly that of evolution—in the service of Christian moral teaching through a kind of magical syncretism made possible by the fanciful world of the text.[2] However, to understand fully the relationship between science and religion and the structures of authority through which they act, one must also consider a third discursive framework which the text both critiques and legitimizes: that of earthly positive law.

For Kingsley's remarks at Sion College allude to more than simply a recasting of natural processes as manifestations of God's will. His reference to these values as embodied in "laws" implies the existence of interconnected systems

Erin Sheley is Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the George Washington University, where she is also a doctoral student in English. Her work on criminal law and cultural narrative has appeared previously in this journal, as well as in the *Indiana Law Journal*, the *Michigan State Law Review*, the *Byron Journal*, and *Romanticism on the Net*.

 Pp. 133–152.

of authority to create such laws and, as Kingsley's habitual usage makes clear, to enforce them through punishment, a process which necessarily implicates human as well as evolutionary or divine lawgivers. This preoccupation with punishment is exemplified by *The Water-Babies*; Tom flees from his earthly judges into a world in which physical and procedural trials and punishments mark his progress from "heathen" to Christian man of science. Kingsley utilizes the discourses of both science and earthly law to access what he believes to be a set of universal spiritual truths, but this triangulation breaks down into a perplexing multiplicity of authorities, all of whom seek to assert legal and penal control over Tom.

I will argue that Kingsley initially attempts to interpose an embodied Mother Nature in lieu of earthly systems of positive law as a more suitable mediator of divine laws. Yet ultimately nature herself fails as a dispenser of divine justice, and Kingsley's fantasy world of nature collapses into a return to reliance on earthly systems of legal authority. Kingsley's effort to develop a principled reconciliation of evolution and God, then, fails in its pragmatic execution, leaving scientific discourses about the physical world somewhat morally suspect. Yet Kingsley's simultaneous failure to rehabilitate satisfactorily the positive law framework he challenges early in the text leaves Tom—and the reader—uncertain as to the proper sources of authority best suited to mediating the universal right and wrong. His eventual reliance on essentialist moral qualities of English common law underscores the discursive contingency of nineteenth-century conceptions of just punishment in general.

While tensions over the legitimacy of punishment always complicate the standard liberal narrative of political bodies originating in prepolitical social contracts never agreed to by present-day citizens, these tensions seem uniquely striking in Kingsley's strange text for children, in which he criticizes both discipline and the lack thereof. In this sense, Tom's experiences in *The Water-Babies* resonate with Foucault's account of the "birth of the prison" with the January 1840 opening of Mettray, the French prison farm for juvenile offenders which came to serve as a European model for modern discipline generally (Foucault 1636). Two of Foucault's grim observations about Mettray apply to the fanciful systems of punishment devised by Kingsley. The first is the extent to which Mettray—designed for children and thus ostensibly "created not to be a prison"—was able to "constitute a great carceral continuum that diffused penitentiary techniques into the most innocent disciplines" (1639). In Kingsley's text, the frequent equivalence between the child Tom and adults like Mr. Grimes as proper objects for organized punishment belies any notion that the text speaks only to adult authority over children. The second is the means by which Mettray collapsed the discourses of moral, man-made, and scientific law into a materialist, hybrid "science" of punishment: "the entire parapenal institution . . . culminates in a cell, on the walls of which are written in black letters: 'God sees you,'" and the camp "was related to other forms of supervision, on which it was based: medicine, general education, religious direction"

(1637-38). Mettray, Foucault notes, sought to maintain subjection but also to build a body of knowledge about the "souls" of its inmates; in this process it was supported by new developments in medical and psychiatric discourses "that provided it with a sort of 'scientificity,'" as well as by "a judicial apparatus which, directly or indirectly, gave it legal justification" (1638).

Kingsley's text, always searching for a "natural" material system for dispensing the punishment he takes as spiritually required for the "souls" of his characters, engages yet frequently rejects both the scientific and judicial discourses that support institutions like Mettray. I will argue that his settling upon a fairly narrow positive law mediator as a gateway for spiritual natural law—the English common-law system, specifically—reveals a discomfort with the notion of punishment as either a purely physical science or a simple exercise of coercive power. His ultimate centering of the English common law—more easily accomplished in the simplistic language addressed to a child audience—is a largely unsatisfactory fusing of two discourses of the "natural." To the social-contract origins story, which justifies a state's exercise of punishment against a background of spiritual right, Kingsley adds an evolution-based gloss of Anglo exceptionalism. The anxieties over legality and punishment which emerge in the text become subsumed in a final recursion to "Englishness" so self-consciously constructed as to undermine even the theoretical coherence of the idea of the "natural."

A Natural History

Key to exploring Kingsley's use of penal law is an understanding of what the phrase "natural law" would have meant to a Victorian. Its original meaning was purely theological; early Christian writers such as Augustine had described man in his prelapsarian state as governed by natural law, but posited that after the Fall mankind lost the ability to discern natural law, and required that divine law be mediated through the Church. Thomas Aquinas posited that natural law was derived from the eternal law, "the Divine Reason's conception of things," which was accessible to human beings through reason; to him, the legislation of positive laws was "nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law" (Aquinas 996).[3] Common-law jurists built upon this tradition throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to justify the State's function as a binding legal authority, sometimes blurring it with a Hobbesian, contractualist conception in which natural law resulted from the submission of rational human beings to a sovereign for protection.[4] (The social contract theory, expanded upon and infused with deontological moral content by Locke, has been criticized in more recent times for the actual impossibility of the collective consent on which the system is premised.) The scientific revolutions of the nineteenth century—with their accompanying social theorizing—complicated the vocabulary a bit; the "laws of nature" could now refer to physical theories about the earth and its development. For clarity's sake, where necessary I will distinguish between these two traditions, as "moral natural law" and "physi-

cal natural law," with the understanding that in many contexts the latter was understood (by Kingsley in particular) to point to the former.

Kingsley defended his support for Darwin on the grounds that physical natural laws were manifestations of God's will, and that natural selection was but a feature of the Creation process; writing as early as 1855 against the anticipated accusation that this framework would be "substituting 'natural selection for God,'" Kingsley responded that "natural selection would be only the means or law by which God works, as He does by other natural laws. We do not substitute gravitation for God, when we say that the planets are sustained in their orbits by the law of gravitation" (*Glaucus* 101). A Christian Socialist influenced by Ruskin and Carlyle, Kingsley rejected the notions of Social Darwinism—that evolutionary principles in nature explained the existence of a poor underclass in society—deeming such arguments not only un-Christian, but unscientific.[5] His work does, however, suggest that Kingsley believed natural selection was evidence of a natural hierarchy between the races, indicating that God had willed certain races to succeed over others, at least insofar as some were less inclined toward making the proper volitional choices.[6] Finally, as suggested by his rhapsodic words about the "birds and the flowers" in the 1871 lecture quoted above, Kingsley's reverence for the natural world as a reflection of the spiritual resulted in a heightened reverence for physical nature. In notes on a volume of her husband's letters, Fanny Kingsley observed that "[n]othing helped the books and sermons more than the silence and solitude of a few days' fishing. The Water-babies, especially, have the freshness and fragrance of the sea breeze and the riverside in almost every page" (*Letters* 320). As Naomi Wood has discussed, for Kingsley, "[a]s metaphoric mother, Nature's precepts must be obeyed, her love for her children cannot be compromised, and she implacably punishes those who wrong her or others" (233).

However, as a theologian Kingsley also understood the philosophical conception of natural law as a system of moral precepts justifying the existence of man-made systems of positive law as sources of earthly authority. Throughout his sermons and lectures, Kingsley emphasized obedience to systems of positive law—and submission to punishment thereunder—as necessary to a Christian society. He made a concise explanation of this relationship in his1872 sermon "Capital Punishment":

> Man has sense to make laws (which animals cannot do), just because he is made in the likeness of God, and has the sense of right and wrong. Man has the right to enforce laws, to see right done and wrong punished, just because he is made in the likeness of God. The laws of a country, as far as they are just and righteous, are the copy of what the men of that country have found out about right and wrong, and about how much right they can get done, and how much wrong punished. So, just as the men of a country are (in spite of all their sins) made in the likeness of God, so the laws of a country (in spite of all their defects) are a copy of God's will, as to what men should or should not do. And that, and no other, is the true reason why the judge or magistrate has authority over either property, liberty, or life. (59)

Kingsley's rendition echoes the traditional association of moral natural law with "reason": the men of a particular state have the ability to "find out about right and wrong"—in other words, to create a system of positive law from a system of moral natural law discernable through reason.[7] In the somewhat less religious context of the lecture on natural theology at Sion College, he is quick to emphasize the rationality of the lawmaking in his own country: "For me, as (I trust) an orthodox priest of the Church of England, I believe the theology of the National Church of England, as by law established, to be eminently rational as well as scriptural" (315).

It is also interesting to note that for all of his belief in natural selection as a manifestation of God's will, Kingsley's conception of absolute moral "right and wrong" did not stop at the edge of the woods; even animals acting according to physical natural law, he argued, were capable of violating moral law by committing acts that would be criminal for human beings, despite their asymmetrical exclusion from Salvation and inability to make godly laws of their own or be bound by human positive law. In response to a letter from a man who had watched his friend be consumed by a tiger, Kingsley said of the killing: "a wrong and a crime I believe it to be, and one which God knows how to avenge and to correct when man cannot. Somehow—for He has ways of which we poor mortals do not dream—at the hand of every beast will He require the blood of man" ("Capital Punishment" 54–55). As I will discuss later, *The Water-Babies* contains episodes in which animals are judged by this moral natural law of right and wrong, yet Kingsley never reconciles these moments with the numerous other instances in which he seems to endorse the view of "nature red in tooth and claw" as a necessary feature of God's system of selection.

It is perhaps, in part, due to this apparent insufficiency of physical natural law as a mediator for the spiritual that Kingsley, throughout his writings and especially in sermons, emphasizes the importance of man-made positive law. Perhaps most importantly to the adventures of Tom the water-baby, Kingsley emphatically believed in the State's duty to impose punishment on transgressors, and *The Water-Babies* itself can be read as a discourse not only on sources of law but on structures of punishment. Of capital punishment, Kingsley said that the Bible "speaks very clearly on this point. 'Whosoever sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed.' Man is made in the likeness of God. That is the ground of our law about murder, as it is the ground of all just and merciful law; that gives man his right to slay the murderer; that makes it his duty to slay the murderer" (56–57). In the sphere of punishment, then, positive law does not merely act as a stand-in for divine law; it has affirmative collateral duties imposed upon it, in the absence of which it would itself become unlawful. This position comes close to the Kantian categorical imperative that a state has the moral obligation to vindicate criminal acts through punishment: "Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its members . . . the last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed so that everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof

will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying out the punishment" (Kant 82). Kingsley seems to echo the moral self-containment of the Kantian system in one of his lectures on the biblical David. Rejecting a defense of David's practice of polygamy based upon the cultural ignorance of the time in which he lived, Kingsley argues that earthly law—specifically, in lieu of divine law—was necessary to punish him for it:

> No miracle is needed; no intervention of God with his own laws. His laws are far too well made for him to need to break them a second time, because a sinner has broken them already. They avenge themselves. And so does polygamy. So it did in the case of David. It is a breach of the ideal law of human nature; and he who breaks that law must suffer, as David suffered. ("David's Deserts" 78–79)[8]

The self-containment of this quasi-Kantian penal imperative, which produces its own moral demands even without explicit recourse to divine law, sits in tension with the notion of positive law as but a mediator of moral natural law. Yet it might also explain why—despite the critiques of the several particular discourses on punishment that pervade *The Water-Babies*—Kingsley never questions the necessity, indeed the moral centrality, of punishment itself.

Kingsley is nonetheless preoccupied with the potential tension between the laws of the State and the transcendent, divine law, often describing the former as serving for the most part only as a functional mechanism in the service of the latter. In his introduction to a series of lectures on ancient Alexandria, published in 1854 (nine years prior to *The Water-Babies*), Kingsley expressed that his need to avoid addressing contemporary political controversies in the lectures was beneficial, because he wished "to refer to laws . . . deeper, wider, more truly eternal than the points which cause most of our modern controversies, either theological or political; laws which will . . . reassert themselves . . . under most novel embodiments, but without any change in their eternal spirit" (*Alexandria* x). He went on to note that "political questions have their real root in moral and spiritual ones, and not . . . in questions merely relating to the balance of power or commercial economy, and are . . . finally decided on those spiritual grounds, and according to the just laws of the kingdom of God" (xiv). Despite his belief in the necessity of obeying the positive law as enforced by the State, he was concerned with the potential conflict between those laws (even doctrinal church law) and God's ultimate "just laws." Kingsley's diminution of the sort of material debates among earthly ministers that so often generate positive law reveals his skepticism of such law as an ultimate authority, susceptible as it is to the "defects" he conceded in his broader formulation.

Kingsley reiterates this concern over conflicting positive and moral natural laws two decades later, in an 1874 sermon on the prophet Amos. "The masses," he says, "who ought to hear such a man gladly . . . will dislike that man, because he tells them that God's will is law, and must be obeyed at all risks: and the poor fools have got into their heads just now that not God's will, but the will of the people, is law, and that not the eternal likeness of God, but whatever they

happen to decide by the majority of the moment, is right" ("Preparation for Advent" 17). The tension between the conceptions of positive law as mediator of, or competitor with, moral natural law shapes much of Tom's education and discipline in *The Water-Babies*; that it falls short as a mediator is often due to the failure to respect physical nature. Yet the question of whether physical natural law works as an agent of or is itself subject to moral natural law problematizes the scientific and evolutionary discourses that pervade the text, which themselves become revealed as inextricable from man-made legal power. I will discuss each of these two problems in turn, concluding with thoughts on Kingsley's attempt to resolve this fragmentation and its significance for naturalizing penal authority in general.

The Inadequacies of Positive Law

Throughout *The Water-Babies*, Kingsley manifests ambivalence toward the structures of positive law created by men to distribute punishment; such law, he suggests, may at times be coextensive with the law of nature, moral and physical, but a tension between the two permeates the tale. At the start of the story, Kingsley presents the legal authority to which the human Tom is initially subject as divided between two opposing male figures: the repugnant Mr. Grimes and the "grand old" Sir John. The former, of course, represents the overtly illegitimate authority of the strong over the weak: authority which, Kingsley intimates, is all the more pernicious when its victim perceives it as the legitimate manifestation of a natural order. Tom took Grimes's beatings and other punishments "all for the way of the world, like the rain and snow and thunder, and stood manfully with his back to it till it was over, as his old donkey did to a hail-storm" (2). Kingsley's critique here seems to anticipate Foucault's observation that "perhaps the most important effect of the carceral system and of its extension well beyond legal imprisonment is that it succeeds in making the power to punish natural and legitimate, in lowering at least the threshold of tolerance to penalty" (1643). Kingsley further underscores the vast difference between Grimes's system of discipline and the natural forces to which Tom mistakenly compares it by noting that Grimes "knocked Tom down again, in order to teach him (as young gentlemen used to be taught at public schools) that he must be an extra good boy that day" (2). Grimes thus represents more than just the abusive authority of one tyrant, but also the corrupt authority of an entire institutional and educational framework into which, as Foucault notes, the "carceral system" had extended, which extracts only the false sort of "goodness" that results from the threat of violence.

Even more so than Grimes, Sir John embodies the full weight of the man-made systems of legal and penal authority, introduced almost like the Old Testament God as ultimate dispenser of justice: "of all places upon earth, Harthover Place . . . was the most wonderful, and, of all men on earth, Sir John (whom [Tom] had seen, having been sent to gaol by him twice) was the most

awful" (2–3). Later on, we learn that "four days a week" Sir John hunted, and "the other two he went to the bench and the board of guardians, and very good justice he did" (68). To the extent that Sir John is a foil for, and constrainer of, the low-level abuser Grimes, we may intimate that he wields a more legitimate authority over his county and over Tom himself. "Sir John," Kingsley tells us, "was a grand old man, whom even Mr. Grimes respected," in part because he could "send Mr. Grimes to prison when he deserved it, as he did once or twice a week" (2). Yet this sort of authority, as represented by the positive laws Sir John enforces, is suspect in its own right. The fact that he "own[ed] all the land about for miles," coupled with his enormous physical presence ("he weighed full fifteen stone"), suggests an overconsumption of the land itself, as does the fact that he spends twice as much time hunting as he does doing "very good justice." Kingsley confirms this when he notes that Sir John "would do what he thought right by his neighbours, as well as get what he thought right for himself" (3). Sir John as a source of law, then, is limited by his own human appetites and concerns, limited to what he "thinks" is right and, consequently, necessarily separated from the ideal "right" by his own self-interest.

The potential illegitimacy of Sir John's legal authority to control the physical world over which he has dominion emerges in the relationship between Grimes as poacher and Sir John as landowner. Sir John is in possession of "miles of game-preserves, in which Mr. Grimes and the collier lads poached at times, on which occasions Tom saw pheasants, and wondered what they tasted like; with a noble salmon-river, in which Mr. Grimes and his friends would have liked to poach" (3). While this thievery, particularly as associated with the vile Grimes, is a violation of positive law, Kingsley minimizes it later in describing Grimes's attempts to atone for it. Grimes believed that by touching his hat to Sir John and complimenting his person and his daughters, he "made up for his poaching Sir John's pheasants" (3). Kingsley observes that this belief demonstrates only that "Mr. Grimes had not been to a properly-inspected Government National School" (3). Grimes's stealing of the birds, then, seems less wrong in an absolute moral sense than as a violation of the artificial legal constructs represented by the same bureaucracy governing the school system.

The reason for this ambivalence over the righteousness of Sir John's authority may relate to his own violations of a natural order by asserting dominion over the pheasants, streams, and forests in the first place. When Grimes later encounters Sir John's gamekeeper, "to Tom's surprise, he and Grimes chatted together all the way quite pleasantly. He did not know that a keeper is only a poacher turned outside in, and a poacher a keeper turned inside out" (7). To the extent that the gamekeeper acts as an extension of Sir John's control over the land, he is separated from the thieving Grimes only through the arbitrary distinctions made by positive law. Kingsley suggests that both men may violate a natural order by plundering Mother Earth for their own purposes.

Indeed, the two play undifferentiated roles in the mob chase scene during which Tom is pursued out of Miss Ellie's bedroom and eventually over the fells

to Vendale. While Tom has not, in fact, violated any actual law by entering Ellie's bedroom, the symbolic transgression is so great as to bring down upon him the collective condemnation of a whole microcosm of society, as embodied by the various employees of Sir John's estate who give pursuit en masse. Apart from the obvious critique of a society's unjustified identification of Tom as an object for punishment—a rush to judgment leading to his "death"—the scene also puts the process of human judgment and punishment into tension with the animal world. The pursuit of Tom leads to the execution or injury of no fewer than three equine bystanders whose handlers abandoned them at inappropriate times to join the chase: the groom's horse who "kicked himself lame"; the steward's pony whose chin he "hung up . . . upon the spikes" of the park gate; and the ploughman's horses, one of whom "jumped over the fence, and pulled the other into the ditch, plough and all" (11). While neither Sir John nor Grimes directly harms any living creatures in pursuit of Tom, their equivalent participation in a chase resulting in such collateral violence upon the living world suggests they share complicity in an illegitimate system of judgment and punishment.

In their behavior subsequent to Tom's escape from his pursuers, however, the two men revert to their original contrasting roles. Sir John asks that Grimes "bring the boy quietly up to him, without beating him, that he might be sure of the truth" (29), and when Tom cannot be found, he "sle[eps] very badly" and tells his wife that Tom "lies very heavily on my conscience" (30). Grimes, in the meantime, goes "to the police office, to tell them to look out for the boy" (29). In contrast to Grimes's reliance upon the institutionalized system of legality represented by the police, Sir John refers to a higher system of right and wrong: the search for an objective "truth" mandated by his "conscience."

As it turns out, his conscience prompts Sir John to move more deeply into the natural world, leading his various keepers with their hunting accoutrements on a chase into the woods for the purposes of saving a life by finding Tom, rather than enjoying the recreational plunder derived from a typical hunt. Kingsley describes Sir John's appearance at this moment through a mixture of natural and homely similes: "like a fine old English gentleman, with a face as red as a rose, and a hand as hard as a table, and a back as broad as a bullock's" (30). With his entourage of servants and his shiny hunting attire, Sir John is hardly a Pan-like guardian of the woods, but this friendly description links him aesthetically to the natural world. Further, this linkage is a specifically English one: Kingsley reinforces the pedigree of this "English gentleman" with allusions to the Tudor rose (a heraldic symbol of England) and the bullock ("John Bull" being a personification of Great Britain).[9]

Sir John's Englishness partially legitimates him as a legal authority. During Tom's rush to clean himself in the river, for example, he worries that the church doors will be closed to him if he does not get there in time, but Kingsley notes that "the good old English law would punish that man, as he deserved, for ordering any peaceable person out of God's house, which belongs to all alike" (25).

Positive "English law" may yet be subservient to the higher, holy law represented by the universally accessible church, but at its best, this nationalized positive law may act as servant and protector of the greater law. The connection between Sir John as English lawgiver and church law is further emphasized by his hound, who, at the start of the search for Tom, had "a throat like a church-bell" and "lifted up his mighty voice, and told them all he knew" (30).

Yet even Sir John as a representative of English law is inadequate as an ultimate authority in a state of nature. He is unable to pursue Tom down Lewthwaite Crag—"Oh that I were twenty years younger, and I would go down myself!"—and must send "a little groom-boy" instead (30). They arrive too late to dispense earthly justice to the wronged Tom, and Sir John lacks the understanding of physical or moral natural law necessary to make sense of Tom's fate. "[T]he keeper, and the groom, and Sir John made a great mistake, and were very unhappy (Sir John at least) without any reason," when they discover what they think is Tom's corpse (35). The absence of "reason" suggests Sir John's failure to discern the governing principles of moral natural law at work. Furthermore, Kingsley emphasizes Sir John's failure to understand the scientific principles of nature that have occasioned Tom's metamorphosis: "Sir John did not understand all this, not being a fellow of the Linneaean Society; and he took it into his head that Tom was drowned" (35). Therefore, while positive law can, when used properly (i.e., "Englishly"), work in service of a natural moral order, Sir John's imperfections and ultimate impotence demonstrate that it alone is insufficient; it seems there are greater systems of law with claims to Tom's obedience.

Before moving on to discuss those systems, however, it should be noted that this moment sets the stage for Kingsley's eventual attempt to rehabilitate positive law toward the end of the story. Kingsley links Sir John's failure of knowledge to his lacking membership in the Linnean Society, which Kingsley subsequently lampoons as an illegitimate source of scientific authority in the character of Professor Ptthmllnsprts. Though the text then temporarily abandons Sir John and systems of man-made laws, it remains ambiguous as to whether the discourses of science and physical nature which take over as arbiters of Tom's growth and punishment are in fact better arbiters of divine law. By leaving this door ajar, Kingsley complicates even an initial understanding of discourses of physical nature as a superior point of access to spiritual truth, laying the groundwork for the plurality of authoritative discourses the text develops and the potential for a particularized "English" version of positive law to emerge later as a product of the evolutionary processes the text explores from this moment on.

The Authority of "Mother Nature"

After Tom's adventures commence, the primary lawgiver to whom he must learn to submit is some version of "Mother Nature," to whom he gains increasing

access in her multiple guises as the story progresses, and who initially seems to present a better alternative to positive law as an instrument of moral justice. At the very start of his adventures, Tom is confronted with the great symbol of church authority—the "picture . . . of a man nailed to a cross" in Ellie's room, which "surprised [him] very much" (10). Tom's immediate association of the picture with bourgeois commercialism—"he fancied that he had seen something like it in a shop-window"—and the seeming illogic of its pathos—"why should the lady have such a sad picture as that in her room?"—serve to castrate the crucifixion scene of its traditional demands on the viewer's obedience. Later on in the book, Kingsley's aversion to the Catholic church as an earthly mediator of divine law reinforces this distrust of human authority between man and God: "the Scotchman," he says, in contrast to the Irishman, "fears God, and not the priest" (52), and he lists "monks" and "popes" among the other ills in Pandora's box (131). The white bedroom with its Christian trappings thus gives way to the natural forest space, which asserts itself much more successfully as an authority over the fleeing Tom. Where "Old Mrs. Earth" had been "fast asleep" when Grimes and Tom were on their way to Sir John's estate, she comes alive in the guise of the Irish woman who reveals herself as Queen of all the fairies in the river and takes charge of the beginning of Tom's physical evolution and moral education.

Pervasive language and several central episodes in the text suggest that the processes of the natural world do indeed point to a higher-order moral "natural law," and that obedience to Nature herself ought be one of Tom's most important lessons. In the first place, the Irish woman's intonation, "Those that wish to be clean, clean they will be," centers physical change as a mark of moral progress—a connection reinforced by the perpetual references to Tom in his first human form as "a small black gorilla" (13) and "a jolly little black ape, with four hands instead of two" (22). Tom's initial state of biological "pre-humanness" has biblical coordinates as well; after leaving the old dame's cottage in pursuit of a church, Tom becomes suddenly conscious of his dirtiness for the first time, and says out loud, "I must be clean, I must be clean" (25). This self-awareness is that of Adam and Eve, who prior to the Fall were "both naked . . . and were not ashamed," but were afterwards compelled to cover themselves (Gen. 2: 25). Tom's moment of realization corresponds to a similar moment of submitting himself to the physical laws of nature, which—like divine law for the progeny of Adam and Eve—must substitute for the higher-order natural law to which he has lost access through earthly corruption.

Past this edenic point of access, Tom, now a water-baby, reenacts the first murder, rendered in graphic terms as an interference with a process of natural evolution. Curious to see a caddis-fly while still in her larval state, he "broke to pieces the door, which was the prettiest little grating of silk," but the caddis could not speak to him, "for her mouth and face were tight tied up in a new night-cap of neat pink silk" (42). The other caddis-flies present the voice of God here, shrieking that "she would have come out with such beautiful wings,

and flown about, and laid lots of eggs; and now you have broken her door, and she can't mend it because her mouth is tied up for a fortnight, and she will die" (43). Like Cain before him, Tom is ashamed and flees; the natural world has taught him his first moral lesson.

The authority of the natural world is embodied in the three great matriarchal figures of the tale, Mrs. Doasyouwouldbedoneby, Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid, and Mother Carey, though Kingsley presents disembodied nature as an extension of this matriarchy as well (describing salt water, for example, as "the mother of all living things" [61] and extracting Longfellow's description of "Nature, the dear old Nurse" [113]). The pair of elaborately named sisters represents natural forces as a familiar duality: the loving mother and the strict teacher. The salmon tells Tom how her relations, the trout, were "punished" for the vices of laziness, cowardice, and greed: "instead of going down to the sea every year to see the world and grow strong and fat, they chose to stay and poke about in the little streams and eat worms and grubs," and as a result "have grown ugly and brown and spotted and small; and are actually so degraded in their tastes that they will eat our children" (55). The more elaborate example of "devolution" as punishment, of course, is Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid's tale of the Doasyoulikes, whom she warned of a volcanic eruption through the emission of smoke from the mountain but who were ultimately too lazy to move away or to work to rebuild their society after the eruption. Eventually, they "grow so stupid . . . that they can hardly think," and "so fierce and suspicious and brutal that they . . . mope and sulk in the dark forests, never hearing each other's voice, till they have forgotten almost what speech is like," becoming "apes very soon, and all by doing only what they liked" (111). Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid summarizes this fate as her intended punishment for a particular moral failing: "when folks are in that humour, I cannot teach them, save by the good old birch-rod" (109).

Tom also discovers examples of nature intervening on behalf of presumably "good" creatures, to save rather than punish. The salmon tells Tom of how water-babies had warned him and his wife of some new stake-nets, and showed them the way around them, "in the most charmingly obliging way" (54). The babies had also intervened in the food chain, saving an eel from being "eaten by a great black porpoise" (64), and, according to the lobster, they "went about helping fish and shells which got into scrapes" (66). Tom himself is only able to progress on his own evolution—to be able see the other water-babies and to access the world of the embodied Mother Nature—after saving the lobster from a trap (84). In these seemingly morally driven interventions and their rewards, we may see what Kingsley described in his lecture "On Bio-geology" as a "law of mutual help," which he saw working as a complement to that of "mutual competition" (175). If the former is a necessary corollary to the latter, the natural forces at work become more capable of connection with higher-order laws of right and wrong.

It is in the character of Mother Carey that we can most clearly see the possible relationship between physical and moral systems of natural law: "[S]he

was very old—in fact, as old as anything which you are likely to come across, except the difference between right and wrong" (128). The natural law of moral right and wrong, then, pre-dates even the physical manifestations of nature, though nature herself has priority over everything else, including the positive laws and established Church that act as competing filters for this law of right and wrong. Her role, she tells Tom, is not to make things but to "sit here and make them make themselves" (130). This explanation tracks not only with Kingsley's view of evolution as an inevitable earthly process flowing independently from the initial creative act of Divine Providence, but also with the potential and mandate for human beings to discern absolute "right and wrong" on their own, through the mediating presence of nature.

Despite the centrality of the maternal figure of nature as a dispenser of moral justice, however, the text is rife with a competing view of nature as lawless and brutal, wholly divorced from any system of divine or human law. Indeed, the very fragmentation of the idea of maternal nature into a myriad of deeply contradictory figures suggests the impossibility of treating physical natural law as a straightforward mediator of moral natural law. When Tom encounters a family of otters—initially described as the "merriest, lithest, gracefullest creatures you ever saw"—the mother otter attacks him, exclaiming, "Quick, children, here is something to eat, indeed!" and shows "such a wicked pair of eyes, and such a set of sharp teeth in a grinning mouth, that Tom, who had thought her very handsome, said to himself, *Handsome is that handsome does*" (47). This representative of nature—even nature in the guise of yet another mother, engaged in the very natural act of providing for her young—is described as a "wicked old otter," perhaps due to the fact that her potential victim was the humanoid Tom. His death, to Kingsley, would have been a crime just as that of the man consumed by the tiger; the laws of physical nature cease to be benignant when brought into conflict with the concept of a human being as made in God's image. Later on in the story, Kingsley seems to condone almost identical natural lawlessness during Tom's journey to the shiny wall, when a group of puffins "stayed behind, and killed the young rabbits, and laid their eggs in the rabbit-burrows" (122). Of this slaughter Kingsley only observes that it was "rough practice, certainly; but a man must see to his own family" (122). The language of morality used to condemn the mother otter's behavior contrasts sharply with the amoral view of the rabbits' death as part of the benignant process of caretaking; Kingsley lacks a coherent principle whereby natural physical laws of competition and survival can truly be reconciled with the system of "right and wrong" he believes to be paramount.

Even Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid, his primary dispenser of natural justice, cannot operate solely within the confines of physical natural laws, as she did with respect to the Doasyoulikes or to the trout. When Tom flees from Grimes and the mob of Sir John's servants, we perceive him to have escaped a corrupting system of illegitimate human authority and punishment. Yet the successive punishments he receives at the hands of Mother Nature herself are suspiciously

similar to the very systems of human punishment Kingsley critiqued in the early pages of the novel. Upon Tom's initial plunge into the forest:

> [t]he boughs laid hold of his legs and arms, and poked him in his face and his stomach, made him shut his eyes tight . . . and when he got the rhododendrons, the hassock-grass and sedges tumbled him over, and cut his poor little fingers most spitefully; the birches birched him as soundly as if he had been a nobleman at Eton, and over the face too (which is not fair swishing, as all brave boys will agree); and the lawyers tripped him up, and tore his shins as if they had sharks' teeth—which lawyers are likely enough to have. (14)

That the forest not only hurts Tom but "birches" him makes explicit the connection to Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid, "the fairy with the birch rod." But here she does not appear to exact any sort of lawful punishment; Tom has done nothing wrong, and this birching—like the earlier beating by Mr. Grimes—is similarly comparable to an "unfair" form of corporal punishment. Furthermore, the pun on the word "lawyer"—referring to spiky lawyer vines, but with the overt reference to "shark-like" attorneys—makes explicit that this encounter with nature is an entanglement with a system of law possessed of many of the same defects as the positive law of earthly magistrates.

These parallels continue when we come to know Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid in the flesh. She is first introduced as a reader of the Waterproof Gazette, which is printed "on the finest watered paper, for the use of the great fairy, Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid, who reads the news very carefully every morning, and especially the police cases" (80). It appears paradoxical for a "great fairy" to rely on third-hand accounts of events printed in a commercial publication (presumably liable to the same sensationalistic errors as its land-based counterparts) in determining when and where she must dispense justice. Further, the reference to "police cases" confirms that the underwater realm is bound by systems of legal control identical to the earthly ones, and that, indeed, Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid's potency as a law giver depends upon them for success. This reliance is self-conscious; when Tom first arrives at the sacred isle of the water-babies he sees that "instead of watchmen and police to keep out nasty things at night there were thousands and thousands of water-snakes, and most wonderful creatures they were" (87). This contrast to the world of earthly criminal discipline suggests that the natural authorities here are superior. Yet at the very seat of Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid's power—the prison in which Tom finds Mr. Grimes at the end of the story—order is maintained by disembodied police truncheons and blunderbusses, the synecdoche reminding us that only the essence of man-made authority is sufficient for punishing the greatest sinners like Grimes (148–49).

In Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid's cross-examination of Tom for having put a pebble into a sea anemone's mouth, she functions more as a common-law court of justice than as an all-seeing divine being. First, she applies a familiar principle of criminal law, that ignorance of the law is no excuse: "if you do not

know that things are wrong that is no reason why you should not be punished for them" (92).[10] Read against Kingsley's explanation of how earthly, rather than divine, law ought to punish David for his ignorant practice of polygamy, this suggests that Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid operates as a human tribunal and not as a manifestation of the higher power. She reinforces this conclusion by describing her role as lawgiver: "I work by machinery, just like an engine; and am full of wheels and springs inside; and am wound up very carefully so that I cannot help going" (92). This automatic dispensing of justice, without reference to personal pity or mercy, is an old ideal for the role of the common-law judge,[11] but hardly for an all-seeing, eternal God figure, particularly any version of the Christian God of mercy.

After this talk with Tom, she proceeds to punish legions of offenders who have harmed children through ignorance—foolish mothers, careless nursery maids, and "cruel schoolmasters," the last of whom she "birched . . . soundly with her great birch-rod" (94). Comporting with the "eye-for-an-eye" reading of biblical vengeance, this episode demonstrates the need to discipline representatives of authority who abuse their own power to discipline. Yet Mother Earth's own earlier birching of Tom remains unredeemed, a fact that sits uncomfortably with Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid's use of the punishment on those who had used it inappropriately.

Kingsley attempts to resolve this instability with the third major episode in which the fairy appears in the role of lawgiver and punisher: the occasion of Tom's consuming all of the sweets in her cupboard. Here, Kingsley emphasizes her refraining from physical discipline, because if she had used corporal punishment, "she knew quite well Tom would have fought and kicked, and bit, and said bad words, and turned again that moment into a naughty little heathen chimney-sweep" (100). Yet Kingsley highlights this abstinence not as a refraining from physical punishment, but as a refraining from employing these techniques as an interrogation before Tom had actually confessed to the crime. "She leaves that," he says, "for anxious parents and teachers . . . who, instead of giving children a fair trial, such as they would expect and demand for themselves, force them by fright to confess their own faults—which is so cruel and unfair that no judge on the bench dare do it to the wickedest thief or murderer, for the good British law forbids it" (100). Even if she did not already know the truth, we are told, she would "not surely behave worse than a British judge and jury" (100). As with the episode of the sea anemone, this "great fairy," the embodiment of the forces of natural law, is defined almost entirely by her procedural function, which is that of an earthly—a particularly British—common-law court.

It is worthwhile to note, likewise, that just as Kingsley eschews systems of earthly positive law, only to fall back on them in this fashion, so, too, does he embed symbols of the very Catholicism he condemns—with its accompanying human mediators—at the very seat of his natural order. The water-babies and Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid and her sister all reside on "St. Brandan's Isle,"

to where the Catholic saint retired after he grew tired of "the wild Irish" who would not "come to confession and to mass," and who, after his departure, "were changed into gorillas" (86). It appears, then, as though failure to participate in the very systems of "papish" ritual that Kingsley so dislikes led to devolution for the Irish; the church law he dismissed ought yet to have been obeyed. Furthermore, the Irish woman whom Tom met initially on the way to Sir John's estate is revealed to be the embodiment of all natural law, physical and moral, in the entire story; she tells Tom and Ellie that she was, at once, Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid, Mrs. Doasyouwouldbedoneby, and Mother Carey, so dazzling that the children cannot read her true name (155).[12] Physical natural law, then, is at once multiple and unitary; in consolidating her various guises, Kingsley presents a narratively satisfying conclusion to a child's story. Yet by separating the faces of benign, disciplinary, and even malevolent "Mother Nature"—and by linking her punitive authority to the conventions of the English common law—Kingsley undoes her legitimacy as a divine mediator. She emerges, in the end, like Sir John at the beginning: a pastiche of the right and wrong in physical nature, and interrelated to the right and wrong in positive law.

Conclusions

In the epigram at the start of *The Water-Babies*, Kingsley invites his young readers to "come read my little riddle, each good little man; if you cannot read it, no grown-up folk can" (ii). The world he crafts for his young readers is indeed a riddle; it is clear that in order to grow into the "great man of science" Tom eventually becomes, it was necessary for him to become obedient to the systems of discipline mediating between himself and the universal "right and wrong." Yet, if one reads the text with an eye to the often contradictory role of earthly positive law, it is clear that by the end of the story, it is no more clear to the reader how the dynamics of such submission must work. Kingsley invokes systems of positive law and earthly punishment only to first reject and then reinstate them as constitutive of the physical natural law of the story, through which moral natural law must be accessed.

A partial answer may be gleaned through Kingsley's repeated recurrence to the theme of Englishness; Mrs. Bedonebyasyoudid notes, after all, that had Tom not "made up [his] mind to go on this journey, and see the world, like an Englishman," he might have devolved into an eft (112). Likewise, Kingsley's dwelling on those structures of positive law governing the natural world that appear to imitate Anglo systems of justice echoes eighteenth-century philosopher Edmund Burke's famous defense of the Glorious Revolution, in which he argued that English subjects were owed their franchises not on abstract principles "as the rights of men" (a shorthand for a type of natural law), "but as the rights of Englishmen, and as a patrimony derived from their forefathers" (Burke 28). Like Burke, Kingsley endorsed this notion of national tradition as contrasting to and protecting against the state apparatus as arbitrary lawmaker:

"it is reported," he said in his introduction to the Alexandria lectures, "that our rulers have said that English diplomacy can no longer recognize 'nationalities,' but only existing 'governments.' God grant that they may see in time that the assertion of national life, as a spiritual and indefeasible existence, was for centuries the central idea of English policy . . . and that they may reassert that most English of all truths again" (xxii–xxiii).

It is perhaps this association of Englishness with "spiritual" right that grounds the many contradictions in Kingsley's use of both positive and natural law throughout the text. In this light, we may unravel some of the tensions in Sir John's character; as a lawmaking representative of a ruling "government" he is suspect, but as a proper "Englishman" he can do "good justice." What this means for Tom and for Kingsley's young readers, and for their understanding of positive law as relating to ultimate truth, or to the natural world around them, may remain, as Kingsley suggests, a riddle.

Nonetheless, the text has the interesting effect of initially critiquing the naturalization of the nineteenth-century science of punishment in a manner that almost anticipates Foucault's work in a dramatically different mode on the same subject years later. Yet it resolves the critiques of power it offers by putting various spheres of knowledge—the legal, the scientific, and the spiritual—into dialogue and producing an evolutionary account of what is essentially the status quo: the existing English common law. If this cyclical structure is obscured, it is only by the linearity of Tom's growth into adulthood. He has been spared, we may assume, from becoming Mr. Grimes, but the text affords no alternative models to the flawed Sir John and Professor Ptthmllnsprts, and the equally flawed systems of authority they represent.

Notes

1. As Darwin described Kingsley's impression, "A celebrated author and divine has written to me that 'he has gradually learnt to see that it is just as noble a conception of the Deity to believe that He created a few original forms capable of self-development into other and needful forms, as to believe that He required a fresh act of creation to supply the voids caused by the action of His laws'" (481).

2. Gillian Beer has discussed Kingsley's use of Darwinian theories in the novel, particularly Darwin's challenge to Malthus's theories on the deleterious effects of overpopulation. Like Darwin, Beer argues, Kingsley presents biological profusion as a positive, and she notes that Kingsley "grasped much of what was fresh in Darwin's ideas while at the same time retaining a creationist view of experience" (138). John Hawley has explored Kingsley's attempts to reconcile the claims of Christianity with those of science, arguing that Kingsley, "in choosing the commitment of faith of strict empiricism . . . became for many, in an age of increasing dichotomy between the realms of science and religion, a model of a Christian who hoped that the truths of both would ultimately coalesce" (479). Earlier, Arthur Johnston also had explored the role of science in *The Water-Babies* (215–19).

3. Aquinas's elevated view of legal obligation flowed from his confidence that "all men" could "agree . . . in that which is natural to them;" and he held that "the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice" and the extent to which it is "right, according to the rule of reason" (1426).

4. Philip Hamburger has explained that "eighteenth-century Englishmen came to believe that natural law was obligatory because of its nature—no longer usually in the manner of Aquinas because of its eternal reason, but rather because of the nature of man, including his sociable sentiments or affections" (43).

5. In his well-known lecture "Human Soot," on the subject of the impoverished masses in Liverpool, Kingsley said: "it is not the will of God; and therefore the existence of such an evil is proof patent and sufficient that we have not yet discovered the whole will of God about this matter; that we have not yet mastered the laws of true political economy, which (like all other natural laws) are that will of God revealed in facts. . . . I conceive a time when, by a higher civilisation, formed on a political economy more truly scientific, because more truly according to the will of God, our human refuse shall be utilized, like our material refuse" (305).

6. David Levy and Sandra Peart have argued that Kingsley was instrumental in the overthrow of the pre-Darwinian notion that all human beings are the same in their capacity for moral judgment (1). Examples of this assumption abound in *The Water-Babies*, particularly as relating to the Irish. The imagined character Dennis, for example, cannot be trusted "because he is in the habit of giving pleasant answers: but, instead of being angry with him, you must remember that he is a poor Paddy, and knows no better; so you must just burst out laughing; and then he will burst out laughing too, and slave for you . . . and wonder all the while why poor ould Ireland does not prosper like England and Scotland" (52).

7. Elsewhere, Kingsley acknowledges the role of individual choice in establishing and maintaining these earthly systems of positive law. He describes the ancient Israelites as militarily powerful due to "freedom chastened by discipline, and organized by law . . . [T]heir obedience was, after all, a moral obedience; the obedience of free hearts and wills. The law could threaten to slay them for wronging each other; but they themselves had to enforce the law against themselves. . . . [t]hey believed in it, and felt that in obedience and loyalty lay the salvation of themselves and of their race" ("Discipline" 3–4). Of his own English system of laws, he writes that "True freedom can only live with true loyalty and obedience, such as our Prayer-book, our Catechism, our Church of England preaches to us. It is a Church meant for free men, who stand each face to face with their Heavenly Father: but it is a Church meant also for loyal men, who look on the law as the ordinance of God" ("England's Strength" 193).

8. This should by no means be construed to suggest that Kingsley did not conceive of God himself as capable of meting out his own punishments. In an 1868 lecture, he derided the tendency to "think of the Holy Spirit as only a gentle, and what they call a dove-like being," leading to the result that "while they sing hymns about His gentleness and sweetness, they do things which grieve and shock Him; forgetting the awful warning which He, at the very outset of the Christian Church, gave against such taking of liberties with God the Holy Ghost" ("The Comforter" 127).

9. Sir John's appearance of virtue in his hunting regalia epitomizes what a reviewer for *Tait's Edinburgh Magazine* once referred to as a quality of "muscular Christianity" in

Kingsley's characters, a designation to which Kingsley himself took offense ("Muscular Christianity" 100). Henry Harrington has argued in support of Kingsley's endorsement of "manly" rather than "muscular" Christianity, which Harrington sees as epitomized in the character of the "fallen athlete," whom he characterizes as "suspending" his "might" (and his enjoyment of a sporting moment) in favor of "feminine virtue" (73).

10. This doctrine, *ignorantia juris non excusat*, is of ancient application in both common- and civil-law countries in the criminal context.

11. Eighteenth-century legal commentator Giles Jacob summarized this function of English common-law judges: "*Judges* have not the Power to *judge* according to that which they think fit; but that which by Law they know to be right" (549). In his book on judicial duty, Philip Hamburger emphasizes the importance placed on judging in accordance with the laws of England specifically: "already at an early date in the history of the common law the king's commissions to his judges specified their duty with the clause '*facturi quod ad iustitian pertinet secundum legem, & consuetudinem Angliae.*' In other words, they were to do that which pertains to judging according to the law and custom of England" (105).

12. This description echoes Dante's inability to gaze upon Beatrice's face, which was too irradiated with the Divine to be bearable.

Works Cited

Aquinas, Thomas. *Summa Theologica*. 1265–74. Ed. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 5 vols. Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981.

Beer, Gillian. *Darwin's Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983.

Burke, Edmund. *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. 1790. Ed. Frank Turner. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2003.

Darwin, Charles. *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*. 2nd ed. London: John Murray, 1860.

Foucault, Michel. "Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison." *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*. Ed. Vincent Leitch. New York: Norton, 2001. 1636–47.

Hamburger, Philip. *Law and Judicial Duty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008.

Harrington, Henry. "Charles Kingsley's Fallen Athlete." *Victorian Studies* (Autumn 1977): 73–86.

Hawley, John C. "Charles Kingsley and the Book of Nature." *Anglican and Episcopal History* 61 (Dec. 1991): 461–79.

Jacob, Giles. *Law Dictionary*. 1732. Ed. T. E. Tomlins. 6 vols. New York: I. Riley, 1811.

Johnston, Arthur. "*The Water-Babies*: Kingsley's Debt to Darwin." *English* 12 (Autumn 1959): 215–19.

Kant, Immanuel. "The Metaphysical Elements of Justice." *Foundations of Criminal Law*. Ed. Leo Katz, et al. New York: Foundation P, 1999. 80–82.

Kingsley, Charles. *Alexandria and her Schools: Four Lectures Delivered at the Philosophical Institution, Edinburgh*. Cambridge: Macmillan, 1854.

———. *All Saints' Day, and Other Sermons.* Ed. W. Harrison. 3rd ed. London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1878.

———. "Capital Punishment." Eversley. 1872. Harrison, 53–64.

———. "The Comforter." Eversley. 1868. Harrison, 124–33.

———. "David's Deserts." *Five Lectures on David.* London: Macmillan, 1874. 69–89.

———. "Discipline." *Discipline, and Other Sermons.* Wimbledon. 14 July 1867. London: Macmillan & Co., 1899. 1–10.

———. "England's Strength." *Sermons for the Times.* London: Macmillan, 1898. 188–97.

———. *Glaucus, or The Wonders of the Shore.* 1855. London: Macmillan, 1899.

———. *His Letters and Memories of his Life.* Ed. F. Kingsley. New York: Scribner, 1877.

———. "Human Soot." Liverpool. 1870. Harrison, 302–11.

———. "The Natural Theology of the Future." Sion College. 10 Jan. 1871. *The Works of Charles Kingsley: Scientific Lectures and Essays.* Vol. 19. London: Macmillan, 1880. 313–36.

———. "On Bio-geology." Winchester. 1871. *The Works of Charles Kingsley: Scientific Lectures and Essays.* Vol. 19. London: Macmillan, 1880. 155–80.

———. "Preparation for Advent." Westminster Abbey. 15 Nov. 1874. Harrison, 9–29.

———. *The Water-Babies.* 1862–63. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2006.

Levy, David, and Sandra Peart. "Charles Kingsley and the Theological Interpretation of Natural Selection." *Journal of Bioeconomics* 8 (Dec. 2006): 197–218.

"Muscular Christianity." *Tait's Edinburgh Magazine* 25 (Feb. 1858): 100–102.

Wood, Naomi. "A (Sea) Green Victorian: Charles Kingsley and *The Water-Babies*." *The Lion and the Unicorn* 19 (Dec. 1995): 233–52.